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G. E. Müller's excellent little work on Attention is criticised, also his disciple's Pilzecker. The defects of both might have been more fully emphasized.

Wundt's observations on attention are said to be faulty and defective, and his views to be too much influenced by his philosophical conceptions. Wundt's definition of attention: an activity which is perceived along with the going and coming of presentations, and which is accompanied subjectively by a feeling which cannot be more nearly defined,—is strongly criticised.

N. Lange, Külpe, Ziehen and Münsterberg receive sympathetic handling. He makes Münsterberg a disciple of Ribot, inasmuch as attention is regarded by both as a complex of muscle-sensations, and the fluctuation of attention as dependent upon the fluctuation in the strength of muscular contractions.

The author's standpoint is that of Avenarius. His exposition is generally fair; his criticism might often have been severer. He strangely omits all mention of the work of Profs. Ebbinghaus, Hering, Lipps and Stumpf, the latter's well-known theory of attention being not once mentioned.

ARTHUR ALLIN.

Die Gefühle und ihr Verhältnis zu den Empfindungen. Antrittsvorlesung. Von DR. MAX VON FREY, 1894.

Of the many recent researches into the nature of pain and pleasure and their physiological causes or concomitants (Marshall, Nagel, Nichols, Strong, Oppenheimer, Goldscheider and others), Dr. Frey has contributed his share. His contributions to the physiology of the pain-sense have already been ably reviewed in this JOURNAL (Vol. VII, pp. 113 ff.) by Mr. Luckey. We have here a compact survey of the more general field of feelings in their relation to what are ordinarily called sensations. The characteristic of feeling, whenever it is associated or accompanied by sensation, is held to be the reference to the personality of the person experiencing the sensation. What "personality" may mean here, whether parts of our organism or the mental self, is not explained. He maintains his former thesis that pure sensations, *e. g.*, touch, may be had without any accompaniment of pleasure or pain, and that pain has its own separate nerve endings and pain-conducting nerves. Such are denied the feelings of pleasure, which are somehow connected with the cessation of pain, tension, etc. The "shunt-theory" of Wundt and the older school is not accepted, the objections to it being too conclusive. The pain sense is the only one possessing organs almost everywhere in the body. This great amount of distribution, its usual lack of reference to the objects of stimulation, and its full reference to the organism stimulated, form the first and most pressing step in the formation of a presentation complex, known as the ego. The connection of this with that primordial characteristic, irritability, might have been pointed out.

He disallows the James-Lange theory, but approves of that of Meynert, which to me is largely the same, though not developed enough. By the way, Meynert published his theory of the emotions in 1880, "*Ueber die Gefühle*," now published in his "*Sammlung*;" the James-Lange theory appeared in 1884. Frey's arguments against separate nerve endings for pleasure are not conclusive. His distinction, the general one, between feeling and sensations, has probably worked more harm than good. Frey's answer to the strictures of Nagel (*Pflüger's Archiv*, LIX, 1895) upon

his hypothesis of separate nerve endings, will be interesting. The plain distinction between disagreeableness and pain is, as usual, also not noted.

ARTHUR ALLIN.

Suggestion und Reflex. Eine kritisch-experimentelle Studie über die Reflexphänomene des Hypnotismus. K. SCHAEFFER. Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1895, pp. 113.

We have here a flag of truce appearing in the combat between the opposing forces of the school of Nancy and that of the Salpêtrière. The mediator is a third person, who proclaims that both are right, and that suggestion on the psychical side as well as the reflex phenomena on the somatic side are only two aspects of one single process, or perhaps better still, are two parallel processes associated. Association of ideas, and the movements accompanying usually the ideas, are the parallel processes. "Suggestion is nothing else but an immediate association" (p. 112). Bernheim's words are approved: "The mechanism of suggestion can be thus generally formulated: *Increase of the ideomotor, ideosensitive and ideosensorial reflex excitability.*" As strychnine increases the sensitive-motor excitability in the spinal cord, so that the lightest stimulus on a nerve ending transforms itself immediately into contraction, without the possibility of any inhibitory influence of the brain, so hypnotism is the increase of the ideoreflex excitability of the brain, each presentation as it appears is immediately followed by its associated movement (p. 112). "Suggestion is then to be considered as a psychical, anatomically considered, cortical reflex" (p. 113).

Since suggestibility is a cardinal symptom of hysteria, it is not to be wondered at that senso- and neuro-muscular hyperexcitability is called an "hysterical" phenomenon. The highly pronounced suggestibility is conditioned by a very considerable sinking or diminution of central inhibition. The hypnotic reflex phenomena are not always "hysterical;" association and absence of central inhibition, wherever they occur, are the chief and distinctive features. Hence the hard and fast distinction between the phenomena of *suggestion* and *reflex* falls away.

The experiments are well performed, and the whole work is essentially a worthy contribution to the subject. Suggestion has even a wider application than in the abnormal field. A robber, for example, is seen on the lonely highway at night; upon closer examination it is seen to be the stump of a tree. We have here the phenomena and actions of suggestion. So with all sense-illusions. Even conversation is a continual suggestion, illustrating continually the action of the association of ideas and cortical reflexes. Suggestion is *not* a disturbance of association as Parish (*Trugwahrnehmung*) and many others assert. It is a continual illustration of most excellent association. Only by these means do we have the resulting phenomena. "The disturbed association" is in the external world, in the environment. The cortical mechanism works as it has been taught to work; it is not its fault if the environment changes.

ARTHUR ALLIN.